Protect once, enforce on every outbound request.
Your application talks to SecretProxy once. From there, every request is evaluated against the registered target, the binding policy, and the active secret version before it ever leaves the edge.
SecretProxy replaces live secrets with placeholders and injects the real value only at egress. Your code, CI, logs, and process memory never hold the credential, but your upstream APIs still receive a normal authenticated request.
// application code fetch('https://secretproxy.io/api.stripe.com/v1/refunds', { method: 'POST', headers: { 'Authorization': '{{STRIPE_PROD_KEY}}', 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }, body: JSON.stringify({ amount: 4200, charge: 'ch_9f0fd4' }) }) // SecretProxy resolves the placeholder at egress // Upstream receives the real bearer token
No secret manager lookup inside application code.
Only registered hosts and allowed placeholders pass.
Secret is decrypted and inserted outside your runtime.
No changes required from the third-party API.
SecretProxy is built for the production details buyers actually ask about: where the credential lives at runtime, how target scope is enforced, how rotation rolls forward and back, and how platform teams keep outbound access legible.
Your application talks to SecretProxy once. From there, every request is evaluated against the registered target, the binding policy, and the active secret version before it ever leaves the edge.
Update the secret value once and every service uses the new credential on the next request.
A placeholder bound to Stripe cannot be replayed against OpenAI or any other registered target.
Rotation events, binding changes, and request posture become visible without spraying secrets into logs.
SecretProxy is not just a masked token store. It is the runtime enforcement layer that sits between application code and the real credential material.
SecretProxy gives platform and security teams a runtime control they can explain to a CISO: credentials stay outside application memory, outbound targets are registered explicitly, and rotation becomes an auditable infrastructure event instead of an opaque application behavior.
When a service is compromised, the attacker should not automatically inherit every outbound API credential that service uses. SecretProxy changes that default by replacing live tokens with scoped placeholders and resolving the real secret only when traffic leaves the trusted boundary.
Remove long-lived credentials from app memory, crash dumps, debug tooling, and ad hoc scripts that grew around them.
Teams usually change the URL and placeholder string, not the language runtime, sidecar model, or app architecture.
Bindings are version-aware, so promotion and rollback are explicit events with cleaner operational context.
Hosted edge for speed, or enterprise in-cluster delivery when regulated workloads need the final decrypt closer to home.
Fastest way to move credentials out of services while keeping onboarding lightweight for app teams and platform engineers.
Use the same placeholder and binding model while layering in longer retention, architecture review, and stricter tenant controls.
The docs roadmap already points here: run an egress proxy in Kubernetes so services call an internal hostname and secrets are injected locally.
The path is intentionally short. The control surface is intentionally rich. Teams get better runtime isolation without adding a new library to every service they own.
// service code fetch('https://secretproxy.io/api.stripe.com/v1/charges', { method: 'POST', headers: { 'Authorization': '{{STRIPE_PROD_KEY}}' } }) // binding target: 'api.stripe.com' placeholder: 'STRIPE_PROD_KEY' injection: 'header' header: 'Authorization: Bearer {{secret}}'
The app sends a placeholder string. SecretProxy resolves the secret version and constructs the real authorization header only when the request is forwarded to the registered upstream host.
// service code fetch('https://secretproxy.io/api.openai.com/v1/responses', { method: 'POST', headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }, body: JSON.stringify({ api_key: '{{OPENAI_KEY}}', model: 'gpt-5.4', input: 'summarize audit trail' }) }) // binding injection: 'body' template: '{{secret}}'
Not every provider uses an auth header. SecretProxy can scan the safe request body, replace allowed placeholders, and reject unresolved tokens before the request leaves the edge.
// dashboard action PUT /api/secrets/12 { value: 'sk_live_7F...new' } // promote binding binding: 'STRIPE_PROD_KEY' from_version: 11 to_version: 12 // next request automatically uses v12
Secret rotation becomes an operational change instead of an application rollout. Keep previous versions for rollback, promote the new one when ready, and let the next request pick it up.
Secret managers solve where credentials live at rest. SecretProxy solves whether your application ever needs to touch them at runtime. That difference is what changes the blast radius of a compromised service.
| Capability | .env / config | Secret manager SDK | SecretProxy |
|---|---|---|---|
| Credential stored securely at rest | Usually no | Yes | Yes |
| Credential enters app memory | Always | Yes | No |
| Rotate without redeploying consumers | Rarely | Depends on app logic | Yes |
| Per-host policy enforcement | No | No | Yes |
| Works with any HTTP client | Yes | SDK-specific | Yes |
| Blast radius after app compromise | Full credential exposure | Credential still readable | Secret stays outside runtime |
Register the hosts, bind the placeholders, promote new versions when needed, and keep service teams from rewriting the same secret retrieval logic over and over again.
Secrets stop appearing in application memory, debug output, and configuration sprawl. The runtime posture changes even though developers keep writing ordinary HTTP requests.
No agent, no sidecar, no new client SDK. If the service can already make a request, SecretProxy becomes another infrastructure layer instead of another library to learn.
SecretProxy should feel simple for developers and legible for enterprise buyers. The control model stays the same whether you are protecting one integration or formalizing outbound credential governance across teams.
For side projects, prototypes, and small integrations that need immediate runtime isolation.
For teams with real production traffic, frequent rotations, and more than a handful of integrations.
For organizations that need private deployment posture, longer audit windows, and an architecture that stands up to security review.